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‘None Having Gone North’1:  
A Re-evaluation of Colonel. Benjamin H. Grierson’s Trans-Pecos 
Campaign against Victorio, July-August, 1880. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Robert N. Watt. 
 
The University of Birmingham. 
 
  
                                                          
1 Grierson to Commanding Officer, District of New Mexico, 2 August, 1880, Mail Copies of Telegrams Rec’d 
1880-85 (unarranged) in National Archives, Washington D.C. (hereafter referred to as ‘NA’) RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 440, pp.34-37 
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Abstract. 
 
In July and August of 1880, U.S. troops led by Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson defeated 
Victorio’s Apache guerrillas in Western Texas. However, the Apache point of view is not 
generally understood. Primary sources show that if the Apache perspective is included, 
Grierson recognised, and avoided, one part of Victorio’s strategy, yet failed to comprehend 
the Apache leader’s clever decoy strategy. As such, Victorio came very close to breaching 
Grierson’s defences and winning this campaign. Nevertheless, Grierson’s ignorance of this 
decoy strategy was offset by his use of small scouting detachments and intelligence received 
from Mexican troops allowing him to emerge victorious. 
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Introduction. 
 
In the summer of 1880, elements of the Tenth U.S. Cavalry regiment and Pueblo Indian 
scouts, commanded by Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson, confronted Chihenne2 and Mescalero 
Apaches led by Bi-Du-Ya, better known as Victorio, in the Trans-Pecos region of western 
Texas. Previous scholarship regarding Grierson’s operations and can be summarised as 
follows: having extensively surveyed the Trans Pecos between 1877 and 1879, Grierson was 
able to outmanoeuvre Victorio by picketing the known waterholes and passes, fending off 
Apache probes at Tinaja de las Palmas (30 July) and Rattlesnake Springs (6 August) and 
preventing the latter’s attempt to reach the Mescalero Apache reservation in New Mexico. 
Grierson’s success prevented Victorio from replenishing his munitions and this contributed to 
Victorio’s death at the hands of Chihuahua State troops at Tres Castillos, Mexico on 14/15 
October, 1880.3 
However, this account misses three issues. First, a closer examination of the primary 
sources reveals that Grierson’s defence was not as secure as he subsequently reported to his 
superiors. Secondly, his survey of the area was not as complete as Grierson (and, indeed, 
history) would suggest. Finally, both the Indians and the army demonstrated far more 
flexibility and tactical skill than is generally recognized. Victorio attempted to use a decoy 
strategy, which had previously confounded the Ninth Cavalry in New Mexico between the 
fall of 1879 and again in the winter of 1880. That this strategy failed was certainly due to the 
efforts of Grierson and his forces. In fact, the campaign of July and August 1880 can be 
likened to the on-going sparring between equally matched opponents. In Victorio and 
Grierson we have two very talented military leaders attempting to maximise their strengths 
and minimise their weaknesses in order to achieve victory. 
This episode was the last major campaign against American Indians in the Trans-
Pecos region by the US army and paved the way for railroad construction4 and settlement in 
the region.5 
                                                          
2 Also known as Warm Springs, Ojo Caliente, Mimbres, Mimbreno and Eastern Chiricahua Apaches. The army 
clearly referred to them as a branch of the Chiricahua Apaches. Chihenne means ‘red paint people’ and their 
territory was southwestern New Mexico and northwestern Chihuahua. Their favoured camping areas were in the 
San Mateo and Black Range Mountains of New Mexico centred on the hot springs at Ojo Caliente. They 
sometimes allied with the Mescalero Apaches who lived to the east and whose territory was centred on the 
Sacramento Mountains of New Mexico. The Mescaleros ranged southwards through New Mexico and western 
Texas into northern Chihuahua. 
3 See for example: Leckie, W.H., 1967, The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro Cavalry in the West 
(University of Oklahoma Press: Norman); Leckie, W.H. & Leckie, S.A., 1984, Unlikely Warriors: General 
Benjamin Grierson and His Family (University of Oklahoma Press: Norman); Leckie, W.H. & Leckie, S.A., 
2003, The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Black Cavalry in the West - Revised Edition (University of 
Oklahoma Press: Norman); Thrapp, D.L., 1967, The Conquest of Apacheria (University of Oklahoma Press: 
London); Thrapp, D.L., 1974, Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches (University of Oklahoma Press: London); 
Matthews, J., “Squarely Fought: Fort Concho and the Campaign against Victorio, 1880,” West Texas Historical 
Association Year Book, Vol. 69, (1993), 34-44; McChristian, D.C., “Grierson’s Fight at Tinaja de las Palmas: 
An Episode in the Victoria (sic) Campaign,” Red River Valley Historical Review, Vol. 7, (Winter 1982), pp.45-
63; Temple, F.M., “Federal Military Defense of the Trans-Pecos Region 1850-1880,” West Texas Historical 
Association Year Book, Vol. 30, (1954), 40-60; “Colonel Grierson in the Southwest,” Panhandle Plains 
Historical Review, Vol. 30, (1957), 27-54; “Colonel B. H. Grierson’s Victorio Campaign,” West Texas 
Historical Association Year Book, Vol. 35, (1959), 99-111 & “Colonel B.H. Grierson’s Administration of the 
District of the Pecos” West Texas Historical Association Year Book Vol. 37, (October 1962), 85-96; Dinges, 
B.J. “The Victorio Campaign of 1880: Cooperation and Conflict on the United States – Mexico Border,” New 
Mexico Historical Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, (Jan 1987), 81-94 
4 It is fairly certain that the last Apache attack in the Trans-Pecos was perpetrated by Chiricahua Apaches, led by 
Nana, when “Bell and Smith, railroad employees; by unknown parties at water-hole between Quitman and Eagle 
Springs, Tex, about July 8, 1881.” (List of Persons Killed, Wounded, or Captured, by Indians, &c., in the 
Department of Texas, since October 1, 1880, officially reported by post commanders. NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
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The Victorio Campaign 1879-1880. 
 
Victorio, a Chihenne Apache leader, led the resistance to the closure of their reservation 
centred around Ojo Caliente, New Mexico in April/May 1877. The closure was part of the 
Department of the Interior’s attempt to concentrate the Apaches upon one reservation at San 
Carlos in Arizona. The key problem with this policy was that different groups of Apaches did 
not necessarily maintain good relations with each. Victorio’s followers were soon embroiled 
in just such a dispute with the San Carlos Apaches, which quickly involved deaths on both 
sides. The fact that the Chihenne Apaches were moved on to the San Carlos reservation after 
its creation also meant that they were also assigned to poorer land than that already occupied 
by the resident San Carlos Apaches, leading to high rates of disease-related mortalities. This 
situation led to the Chihennes fleeing from San Carlos in September 1877. 
After two years of attempting to negotiate the return of their Ojo Caliente reservation, 
Victorio finally lost faith with the U.S. authorities and went to war in August 1879. After his 
flight from San Carlos in 1877 there had been sporadic skirmishes between the U.S. army and 
Victorio’s Apaches, punctuated by a temporary return to Ojo Caliente6 (October 1877 to 
October 1878) and quasi-prisoner7 of war status at that same place (February to April 1879). 
The failure to deal with Victorio’s desire to return to his reservation can be ascribed to the 
hostility between the Office of Indian Affairs (OIA - part of the Department of the Interior), 
and the U.S. army, (controlled by the War Department8). The army very quickly came to see 
the policy of concentration, combined with the corrupt practices of reservation employees 
nominated by the OIA, as having a disastrous effect upon U.S.-Apache relations. These 
political battles were fought out in Washington D.C. between the Secretaries of the 
Department of the Interior and the War Department. The Victorio War was almost certainly 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2546, p.829; The Record of Engagements, p.100). Nana’s raiders had killed at least eight persons in Mexico 
approximately forty to fifty miles to the southwest of Fort Quitman on 28 and 29 of June, 1881. They would 
launch their next attack in the Sacramento Mountains, New Mexico on 17 July, 1881. 
5 Professor Robert Wooster kindly pointed out to me that Grierson, in early 1881, commented that “a settled 
feeling of security” and this would hopefully encourage “a rapid and permanent increase of the population and 
wealth” in the Trans-Pecos. (Grierson’s General Orders No.1, Feb. 7, 1881 published in the Army & Navy 
Journal, Feb. 26, 1881). This ultimately allowed the army to redeploy forces away from the region and by the 
Geronimo Campaign of 1885-1886 we find the Tenth Cavalry deployed against the Apaches in Arizona. 
6 On his breakout from San Carlos, Victorio and most of his following reached Fort Wingate and attempted to 
negotiate a return to Ojo Caliente, New Mexico. While this was being considered the Apaches were allowed to 
return to Ojo Caliente. When this request was refused, Victorio fled with most of the warriors and some of their 
families, while Loco another of the leaders of the Chihennes agreed to return to San Carlos with the remainder 
of the Apaches. It would appear that three leaders directed the Chihenne Apaches in the 1870s; Victorio, Loco 
and Nana. Loco clearly favoured the route of peaceful negotiation but Victorio and Nana clearly favoured 
negotiation backed by the threat of force.  
Apache testimony clearly indicated that Nana acted as Victorio’s second-in-command during this 
period but is rather vague as to his activities while acting in this capacity. The author can only clearly pinpoint 
Nana as acting as a go-between on the Mescalero reservation between December 1878 and August 1879; 
leading a raiding party in the Rio Grande valley in March 1880, being with a group of Apaches who managed to 
hide from a large force of Ninth Cavalry troops in the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Hembrillo Canyon 
(6/7 April, 1880) and acting as the Apache’s rear-guard commander whilst on the march just before the Apaches 
reached Tres Castillos. History has paid far more attention to Nana’s role as a leader in the 1881-1886 period 
after Victorio was killed. 
7 Quasi-prisoner of war refers to the fact that the commander of the Ninth Cavalry detachment then garrisoning 
Ojo Caliente, when Victorio arrived in February 1879, gave the unintended impression to his superiors that the 
Apaches had surrendered. When his superiors realised their mistake they instructed him to bring the Apaches 
under closer supervision and the latter promptly fled. 
8 I have seen both ‘Department of War’ and ‘War Department’ used interchangeably but if one consults the 
Annual Reports of the Secretary of War the latter form is used. 
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precipitated in 1879 as a result of frustrations born of the failure of the Departments of 
Interior and War to reach a consensus concerning the return of Ojo Caliente to the Chihenne 
Apaches. Between September 1879 and May 1880, Victorio defeated and outmanoeuvred his 
U.S. and Mexican opponents and inflicted major damage upon their ability to operate. This 
was principally achieved by killing horses and pack mules, either directly by shooting them, 
or indirectly by leading their opponents on prolonged pursuits over very difficult terrain.9 
However, in May 1880, Victorio suffered a major defeat at the hands of an Apache scout 
company and had retreated into Mexico.10 During June 1880, Victorio had raided extensively 
in northern Chihuahua. If he could drive the livestock taken in these attacks to the Mescalero 
Apache reservation in New Mexico, Victorio could replenish his dwindling stocks of rifles 
and ammunition. Colonel Edward Hatch, Commander of the District of New Mexico, thought 
that Victorio would attempt to return to the Mescalero reservation via Western Texas. This 
would mean that the Apaches would be passing through the Military District of the Pecos 
commanded by Colonel Grierson.11 
 
Grierson’s Plan of Campaign. 
 
Grierson had led the Tenth Cavalry since its formation in 1866. Prior to taking this command, 
Grierson had enjoyed a successful Civil War career, the most notable service being his 
leadership of the Union cavalry raid in support of General Ulysees S. Grant’s Vicksburg 
campaign in 1863. By the mid-1870s some of his regiment had been transferred to Western 
Texas and, after a few brushes with Mescalero Apache raiders, who habitually passed 
through this area to trade and raid in Mexico, a thorough survey of the District of the Pecos 
was ordered in 1878.12 By the time Victorio had retreated into Mexico in May 1880, Grierson 
thus assumed he had a comprehensive survey of the Trans-Pecos region. Meanwhile, in New 
Mexico, Colonel Hatch had taken charge of the campaign against Victorio in January 1880.13 
By May-June 1880, having failed to get permission from Mexico to pursue Victorio across 
the border, Hatch had to prepare his forces for any attempt by the Apaches to return to the 
USA. Hatch proposed that five companies of the Tenth Cavalry be temporarily be transferred 
to Fort Stanton (in New Mexico), to prevent Apaches trading for munitions on the adjacent 
Mescalero Apache reservation.14 While the Tenth Cavalry picketed the Mescalero reservation 
                                                          
9 For more details see RN Watt “‘Horses Worn to Mere Shadows’: The Effects of Campaigning against Apaches 
upon the Ninth U.S. Cavalry Regiment in New Mexico Territory 1879-1881” New Mexico Historical Review 
(Spring 2011) 61-86 
10 This was effectively a continuation of the feud between the San Carlos Apaches which had originated in 1877. 
In late April/early May some of Victorio’s Apaches had targeted and killed a San Carlos leader and at least ten 
of his followers including women and children. Later that month an Apache scout company with a number of 
San Carlos Apaches had attacked Victorio’s camp killing 55 men, women and children and wounding Victorio. 
This feud was one of the reasons that Victorio and a number of his followers had to negotiate for a return to Ojo 
Caliente as they knew that they would be prime targets for retaliation if they returned to San Carlos. This was 
probably not appreciated by either the OIA or the U.S. army which can only have further reinforced the 
frustration felt by the Chihenne Apaches. 
11 Both the Tenth Cavalry Regiment and their sister regiment the Ninth were made up of African-American 
troops who have become popularly known as the ‘Buffalo Soldiers’. 
12 Vincent to CO, District of the Pecos, (Hereafter referred to as ‘DoP’) 30 April, 1878 in Register of Telegrams 
Rec’d Jan. 23, 1878-Feb. 4, 1881, HQ Records of the District of the Pecos 1878-1881, (Hereafter referred to as 
‘HQ DoP’) M1381, Roll 2, Page.19, Letter No. 40 
13 Pope’s Annual Report Year ending September 22 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, p.612; Report of 
General John Pope, 22 September 1880 in Annual Reports of the War Department, NA, M997, Roll 35, 1880 
Vol. I-II, p.86 
14 Sheridan to Pope, 22 May 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; See also Pope to Whipple, AAG 
Chicago, 3 June 1880, ‘Victorio Campaign, Feb. 1879-Nov. 1880’ in ‘Victorio Special Files’, NA, M1495, Roll 
14; Dinges, 1987, p.87; McChristian, 1982, pp.49-50 
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in New Mexico, additional troops would be deployed along the border to counter any effort 
made by Victorio to return from Mexico. 
Although General Philip H. Sheridan15, had endorsed the plan, Grierson staked his 
reputation upon an alternative strategy. He argued that his troops would be better deployed in 
defending the District of the Pecos which they had already surveyed. This involved guarding 
known springs, river crossings and mountain passes along the Rio Grande borderlands.16 
Grierson was also determined that his troops and mounts should not be worn out in similar 
circumstances to the Ninth Cavalry’s experience of campaigning against Victorio between 
September 1879 and June 188017. In other words, his strategy was to prevent the Apaches 
from moving through the trans-Pecos region by a process of ‘picket and patrol’ rather than 
prolonged pursuit. 
In fact, both the Apaches and the U.S. cavalry had key resource vulnerabilities. The 
Apaches often found themselves chronically short of rifles and ammunition, and had to 
constantly try to renew their supplies through trading and raiding. On the other hand, the U.S. 
army had found that the Apache tactics were taking a prohibitively expensive toll upon its 
horses and mules. The key illustration of this point came in late May 1880 when General 
William T. Sherman forbade the purchase of additional horses or mules until Congress 
approved the army’s budget for the financial year 1880-1881.18 Grierson was thus attempting 
to combat the Apaches in such a way as to minimise the effectiveness of their horse killing 
tactics while simultaneously putting pressure on the Apache’s ability to replenish their 
munitions. 
Grierson’s concerns were not without foundation. By June 1880, Victorio’s tactic of 
targeting his opponent’s horses and mules had crippled the operational effectiveness of the 
Ninth Cavalry, which sustained 34.4% of the total number of horses lost by the entire U.S. 
army between July 1879 and June 1880.19 Of those Ninth Cavalry horses who had survived, 
there were more horses judged to be unserviceable than serviceable.20 Grierson was 
determined that he would not be drawn into such a fruitless venture on unfamiliar terrain 
Moreover, Hatch himself probably provided Grierson with additional grounds for proposing 
this plan. By 8 June, 1880, Hatch predicted that the Apaches would try to reach the 
Mescalero Apache reservation by returning through Grierson’s District of the Pecos 
somewhere in the vicinity of Old Fort Quitman, situated on the Rio Grande, approximately 
sixty miles downstream from El Paso. It is not clear exactly why Hatch reached this 
conclusion, but he seems to have assumed that the large number of Mescalero Apaches allied 
                                                          
15 Sheridan commanded the Military Division of the Missouri, one of three Military Divisions of the U.S. army, 
the other two being the Divisions of the Atlantic and the Pacific. There were a number of Military Departments 
within Sheridan’s including the Department of the Missouri under General John Pope and the Department of 
Texas Commanded by General Edward O.C. Ord. Hatch commanded the District of New Mexico reporting to 
Pope and Grierson commanded the District of the Pecos under General Ord. 
16 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 28 May 1880 in Telegrams Sent April 24, 1879-June 22, 1880, HQ 
DoP, NA, M1381, Roll 1, pp.267-268, Letter No.173; Grierson to Col. Hatch 19 July 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, 
Entry 439, pp.551-53; Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, 24 June 1880 in Telegrams Sent June 23, -November 30, 
1880, HQ DoP, NA, M1381, Roll 1, pp.18-19, Letter No. 249; ‘Grierson’s Report’; NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 
2546, pp.639-644; Dinges, 1987, p.87; Temple, 1957, pp.49-50; Temple, 1959, pp.99-100; Matthews, 1993, 
p.37; McChristian, 1982, p.50 
17 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 4 June 1880 in Telegrams Sent April 24, 1879-June 22, 1880, HQ 
DoP, NA, M1381, Roll 1, pp.277-280, Letter No.190 
18 Sherman to Pope, 29 May 1880, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, Military Division of the 
Missouri, Vol. 13, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, 290-291 
19 See Watt ‘Horses Worn to Mere Shadows’ p.205 
20 See Watt ‘Horses Worn to Mere Shadows’ p.202-203 
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to Victorio would try to return to their reservation by that route having been supposedly 
thwarted from doing so by Hatch’s troops in New Mexico.21 
By the end of May 1880, Grierson had deployed, or was in the process of deploying, 
the Tenth Cavalry to that end,22 though his plan was not endorsed by General Sheridan until 
27 June, 1880.23 He seems not to have shown any interest in recruiting Apache auxiliaries for 
the campaign, opting instead for a detachment of nineteen24 Pueblo Indian scouts, stationed at 
Eagle Springs.25  
 
Grierson’s Campaign against Victorio. (See Map One) 
 
In mid-July, Mexican authorities informed Grierson that federal and state troops were 
campaigning against Victorio. Grierson mobilised his forces and leaving his headquarters at 
Fort Concho, Texas, established a temporary field headquarters at Eagle Springs. From this 
point he intended to direct operations against Victorio should the Apaches attempt to cross 
the border. Grierson tried to maintain communications with the Mexican commander, 
Colonel Adolfo J. Valle26 However, communications broke down between the U.S. and 
Mexican forces as they were relying on a system of direct communication by mounted 
couriers between Valle and Grierson, (the latter using some of his Pueblo scouts). Grierson 
and Valle also communicated through the offices of Captain Henry R. Brinkerhoff, Fifteenth 
Infantry, commanding Fort Bliss, Texas, just outside of El Paso.27 Grierson would 
communicate by telegraph (whenever possible) with Brinkerhoff, who passed intelligence on 
to Dr Mariano Samaniego, the political officer based in El Paso Del Norte,28 Chihuahua, 
                                                          
21 Hatch, Fort Craig to Grierson, Fort Concho, 9? June 1880, District of New Mexico General and Special Field 
Orders, Letters and Telegrams, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 475, Vol. 7, p.384 & p.385; 21 Loud to AAG Fort 
Leavenworth, 9 June 1880, Telegrams Sent District of New Mexico, (Hereafter referred to as ‘DoNM’) Vol.3, 
Jan. – Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.496; Hatch to AAG, Fort Leavenworth, 8 June 1880, 
‘Victorio Campaign, Feb. 1879-Nov. 1880’ in ‘Victorio Special Files’, NA, M1495, Roll 14 
22 Grierson to AAG, San Antonio, Texas, 28 May 1880 in Telegrams Sent April 24, 1879-June 22, 1880, HQ 
DoP, NA, M1381, Roll 1, pp.267-268, Letter No.173 
23 Vincent citing Sheridan’s telegram of the 27 June 1880 to Grierson, 28 June 1880 in Register of Telegrams 
Rec’d October 11, 1879-October 8, 1880, HQ DoP, NA, M1381, Roll 2, p.167, Letter No.262; Vincent to 
Grierson, 28 June 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d, May 18, 1880- Feb. 4, 1881 HQ DoP, NA, M1381, Roll 4; 
‘Grierson’s Report’, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Dinges, 1987, p.87; Matthews, 1993, p.37; 
Temple 1959, p.101; McChristian, 1982, p.50 
24 Woodward to AAAG, Dist. Of the Pecos, 23 March 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d October 11, 1879-
October 8, 1880, HQ DoP, NA, M1381, Roll 2, p.110, Letter No.122 
25 ‘Grierson’s Report’, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644 
26 Valle commanded the Federal troops stationed in Chihuahua in July 1880. However, this operation also 
involved Chihuahua state troops though it is not clear whether the federales and state troops operated in mixed 
units. They had definitely done so when General Geronimo Trevino had taken the field with his federal troops 
against Victorio in December 1879 and January 1880 where there were at least two columns of federal/state 
troops pursuing Victorio. Colonel Joaquin Terrazas acted in a subordinate capacity to Trevino in this period. 
Therefore it is not unlikely that Valle’s forces were made up of both federal and state troops though the author 
can find no evidence that Terrazas was involved with Valle’s expedition. The original reason for the presence of 
Federal Troops in Chihuahua was not to deal with hostile Apaches. It was to bring some political stability to the 
turbulent border states of Mexico to persuade the USA to rescind the ‘Ord Order’. This authorised cross-border 
pursuits into Mexico by U.S. forces based in Texas without asking the permission of the Mexican authorities. 
(Best source to consult on this issue would be Dinges, B.J. “The Victorio Campaign of 1880: Cooperation and 
Conflict on the United States – Mexico Border,” New Mexico Historical Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, (Jan 1987), 81-
94) However, once a measure of stability was established the Mexican Federal army were deployed alongside 
Chihuahua state troops against the Apaches. 
27 Ord to Pope, 22 July 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, 
Military Division of the Missouri, Vol. 13, pp.460-461 
28 Today known as Cuidad Juarez 
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Map One: Grierson’s Campaign July/August 188029 
 
  
                                                          
29 For those readers interested in viewing a colour version of the author’s maps can email the author and he will 
attach a scanned copy of these maps to a return email. The author can be contacted at:  r.n.watt@bham.ac.uk  
The maps are drawn by the author and are derived from the U.S. and Mexico 1:250 000 maps and each grid 
square measures 27.5km by 27.5km. It should be noted that the eastern side of this map the grid square is 
slightly truncated and measures 27.5km by 25km. The northern side of this map measures approximately 6km 
by 27.5km.  
It should be noted that any map drawn by the author no matter what scale the grid square is drawn 
round this 27.5 by 27.5km grid squares. 
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Key Date 
(1880) 
Event 
1. Mid July Mexican State & Federal troops unsuccessfully attempt to trap Victorio in the Sierra El 
Fierro. This is approximately 25km to the southwest of the arrow point on the map. 
2. 21 July Colonel Valle’s forces clash with Victorio at Ojo del Pino in the Sierra del Pino. 
(Approximate Location) 
3. 22 July Colonel Grierson arrives at Vieja Pass 
4. 23 July Grierson travels from Vieja Pass to Eagle Springs via Van Horns Wells. 
5. 25 July Valle once again fights Victorio in the Sierra Del Pino. (Approximate Location) 
6. 27 July Grierson travels from Eagle Springs to Old Fort Quitman. 
7. 28 July Grierson meets with Col. Valle at Old Fort Quitman 
8. 29 July Travelling back to Eagle Springs from Old Fort Quitman, Griersons encounters an Apache at 
Tinaja de las Palmas. Reports arriving from scouts out of Old Fort Quitman and Eagle 
Springs report a large party of Apaches moving towards Grierson from the Rio Grande. 
30 July Skirmish between Victorio and Grierson at Tinaja del las Palmas.  
9. 30 July Grierson moves his forces back to Eagle Springs from Tinaja de las Palmas. 
10. 1 August Grierson sends scout detachments out to scout to the south of Eagle Springs. One 
detachment is sent to Alamo Springs. The primary records imply that these detachments are 
made up of small groups of Tenth Cavalrymen or Pueblo Indian scouts. 
11. 1 August Captain Thomas C. Lebo, scouting the Sierra Diablo with Company K, Tenth Cavalry, 
captures a camp full of supplies. He pursues the Apaches north out of these mountains. He 
loses contact with them and returns to the Sierra Diablo to continue his scouting mission. 
12. 3 August The small scouting detachment sent to Alamo Springs engages a large party of Apaches in a 
running battle moving northeast towards the Van Horn Mts. 
13. 3-4 
August 
The news of the clash between his troops and the Apaches convinces Col. Grierson to move 
his troops from Eagle Springs to Van Horn Wells and beyond. 
14. 4 August A detachment of the 10th Cavalry is ambushed in the Guadalupe Mts probably by the same 
Apaches who were attacked by Capt. Lebo on 1 August. This is approximately 30km to the 
north and slightly east of the arrow point on the map. 
15. 5-6 
August 
Very early on 5 August, Grierson realises that the Apaches have outmanoeuvred him. He 
gathers his command in the vicinity of Van Horn Wells and by the early hours of the 6th has 
marched his forces northward to Rattlesnake Springs. 
16. 6 August Inconclusive battle with Victorio at Rattlesnake Springs. 
17. 7 August Grierson sends detachments from Rattlesnake Springs to picket Apache and Sulphur Springs 
to the north. (Note: the locations of these waterholes are approximate) 
18. 8 August Grierson is joined by a company from the Eighth Cavalry with a small group of Lipan 
Apache scouts at Rattlesnake Springs. They are sent to scout to the south and later return to 
confirm that Victorio had withdrawn into the Sierra Diablo after the skirmish at Rattlesnake 
Springs. A small detachment of Texas Rangers also join Grierson at Rattlesnake Springs. 
19. 9 August The Sierra Diablo is scouted by the Pueblo, Lipan Indian scouts and the Infantry 
accompanying Grierson’s battalion. 
20. 10 
August 
Grierson sends troops under Captain Nicholas Nolan to Fresno Spring to scout the southern 
end of the Sierra Diablo.  
21. 10 
August 
Grierson travels to Sulphur Spring from Rattlesnake Springs and orders troops under Captain 
Louis Carpenter to scout southwards along the west side of the Sierra Diablo. 
22 11 
August 
Victorio’s trail is finally discovered by Capt. Carpenter. It goes west towards Fort Bliss then 
turns south towards the Rio Grande. Carpenter estimates that he is a day and a half behind 
the Apaches. By the end of the day he has to break off the pursuit as his horses are 
exhausted. He sends word to Capt Nolan who joins Carpenter at Eagle Springs at around 
Midnight 
23 12 
August 
Nolan departs from Eagle Springs and picks up the trail two miles from Tinaja de las Palmas 
and follows it south to the Rio Grande where it turns east and makes for Ojo Calientes, 
Texas. 
24 13 
August 
Nolan finally confirms that the Apaches have crossed back into Mexico in the vicinity of Ojo 
Calientes 
  
10 
 
Mexico, who communicated with Valle by mounted courier. This system, while not reliable, 
was probably the best that could have been arranged. 
On 28/29 July, Grierson travelled with a small escort to Old Fort Quitman and 
managed to make contact with Colonel Valle, the Federal Mexican army commander. On his 
return journey to Eagle Springs Grierson encountered one of Victorio’s scouts and decided to 
picket the water hole at Tinaja de las Palmas, (also known to the army as ‘Eighteen Mile 
Waterhole’), as it was approximately eighteen miles equi-distant from both Eagle Springs and 
Old Fort Quitman.30 The following morning, having received a small reinforcement from 
Eagle Springs, he found himself confronted by at least sixty Apache warriors. These were 
only eventually driven off with the arrival of reinforcements from Eagle Springs and Old Fort 
Quitman. 
However the rebuff of the Apaches at Tinaja de las Palmas was less important to the 
army’s ultimate success than the intelligence received by Grierson just before this 
engagement. At their conference at Old Fort Quitman, Valle had informed Grierson as to the 
general whereabouts of the ‘main body’ of the Apaches, and, within 24 hours, Grierson’s 
own scouting parties had confirmed the location of this group. The latter were probably his 
Pueblo scouts: on being alerted by the Mexicans of their plans to attack Victorio in mid-July, 
Grierson had sent orders to Eagle Springs that his Pueblo scouts should patrol the Rio Grande 
in order to detect any crossing by Apaches. The fact that a second Pueblo scout was killed by 
the Apaches just before the fight at Tinaja de las Palmas also reinforces this point.31 Finally, 
Lt. Leighton Finley credits at least some Pueblo scouts as being present at Tinaja de las 
Palmas, arriving with the troops from Eagle Springs.32 
A closer examination (see Map One) also raises a couple of anomalies which merit 
further investigation. First, some Apaches had penetrated Grierson’s blockade (see points 11 
and 14). Secondly, Grierson’s forces lost contact with the Apaches from the end of the clash 
at Rattlesnake Springs on 6 August until their trail being picked up five days later (see points 
17-22). This suggests that there was at least one source of water in the Sierra Diablo which 
had remained undetected during the Tenth Cavalry’s survey work between 1877 and 1879. In 
other words, both factors suggest that Grierson’s campaign did not proceed as smoothly as 
subsequent historians have suggested. 
 
Insecure Blockade? 
 
Grierson categorically stated that no Apaches managed to get through to the north in the 
immediate aftermath of the fight at Tinaja de las Palmas.33 He repeated this statement in early 
                                                          
30 See Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company A, 10th Cavalry, July/Aug 1880 in NA, RG94 
31 ‘Grierson’s Report’, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644 
32“Friday July 30th – Fight at Rocky Ridge. My first charge (with 10 men G Co.) Troops engaged: - C & G cos 
10 Cav., under [Henry D.] Viele and [Samuel R.] Colladay; my detachment G Co; Pueblo Scouts under [Frank 
H.] Mills, 24 Inf; Gen Grierson, his son Robert, [William H.] Beck a.a.a.g., and Gen Grierson original escort of 
3 or 4 men; - Viele, Colladay & Mills arriving after my charge. – That afternoon, A Co 10 Cav, Capt [Nicholas] 
Nolan, joined us, and later we returned to Eagle Springs. Casualties – Davis, Pvt C Co, Killed; and Lt Colladay 
wounded – several horses killed & wounded. Indians in force. Victorio’s Apaches.” Finley Diary; Robert 
Grierson Diary, 1 August, 1880. Unfortunately, Finley’s diary offers a very minimalist account of events in 
contrast with the diary kept by Robert Grierson, which makes no mention of the Pueblo scouts at this 
engagement. 
33 Beck to Carpenter, 30 July 1880 in Letters Sent September 19,1879 – August 11, 1880, HQ DoP, NA, 
M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.128; Grierson to Hatch Santa Fé 30 July 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.583; 
See slightly tidied up version quoted in Loud to Hatch, 31 July 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.680-681; Sheridan to AG Wash. D.C. 2 August 1880 in ‘Victorio 
Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 527; Whipple to CO, DoNM, 2 August 1880 in NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.46-
49; Grierson to HQ District of the Pecos, 31 July 1880, in ‘Victorio Special Files’, NA, M1495, Roll 14; 
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August and mid-September, 1880.34 However, just a day after the battle he sent the following 
message to Hatch and Colonel George P. Buell in the District of New Mexico35: 
 
I recommend that you send troops to the eastward to the Cornudas and the Wind 
Mountains to hold San Antonio Springs on the south side of the Wind Mountains and 
the waters at Cornudas they should fortify the positions and have sufficient rations & 
forage for other troops to be used if necessary infantry would answer the purpose. It 
would be well to send Cav to the vicinity of the Sacramentos as from pursuit 
indications the hostile Indians will go either there or to the Guadalupes I intended to 
occupy the above named places but have not the troops or transportation to do so I 
should have two companies of Cav at the Guadalupes.36 
 
Thus Grierson knew that he had failed to prevent some of the Apaches from moving through 
the very defences he had personally guaranteed to Sheridan. This was confirmed by three 
events. First, on 30 July, a stagecoach was ambushed and two people killed between Tinaja 
de las Palmas and Eagle Springs. The remains of these men were discovered after Grierson 
returned from his fight at Tinaja de las Palmas to his field headquarters at Eagle Springs.37 
This would certainly have led Grierson to question the effectiveness of his blockade and 
provides a plausible explanation for the above message to Hatch and Buell. It should also be 
noted that Grierson was not tempted to send any troops in pursuit of these Apaches; he was 
not going to be tempted into a horse crippling pursuit but instead chose to alert his colleagues 
in New Mexico to the potential threat. 
Such a conclusion would also have been reinforced by the news of Captain Thomas C. 
Lebo’s discovery of an Apache camp in the Sierra Diablo on 1 August, 1880 and his 
subsequent pursuit of these Apaches north out of the Sierra Diablo towards the Guadalupe 
Mountains.38 It should be noted that Grierson may not have known of this event until Captain 
Lebo joined him on 7 August. 
Finally, these same Apaches were probably the ones responsible for ambushing one of 
Grierson’s patrols in the southern reaches of the Guadalupe Mountains on August 4, 1880. 39 
The Apaches then managed to evade a pursuit mounted by elements of the Tenth Cavalry: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Sheridan to Adjutant General, Washington D.C. 2 August 1880, Press Copies of Letters and Endorsements Sent, 
Military Division of the Missouri, Vol. 13, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2539, pp.483-485 
34 Grierson to CO Fort Bliss, 24 September 1880 in Telegrams Sent June 23, -November 30, 1880 HQ DoP, NA, 
M1381, Roll 1, pp.169-170, Letter No.504 
35 Col. G.P. Buell, commander of the Fifteenth Infantry Regiment, had taken over direction of field operations 
against Victorio in southern New Mexico from Col. Hatch who remained in overall command of the District of 
New Mexico. (See Buell (through Capt. Brinkerhoff) to Grierson, 21 July 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d by General 
Grierson in the Field June 30-Sept. 14, 1880 HQ DoP, NA, M1381, Roll 4) 
36 Brinkerhoff to AAAG SF 31st July 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.572-574 
37 Entry for August 1, 1880, Robert Grierson’s Diary, (Hereafter referred to as ‘Robert Grierson Diary’) 10 July 
to 1 September 1880. Copy courtesy of the Fort Davis Museum Archive. Robert Grierson is clear that it 
occurred late on the 30 of July 1880. 
38 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company K, 10th Cavalry July/Aug in NA, RG94; Record of Events 
August 1880 in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916 Fort Davis, Texas Jan 1879-June 1891, M617 Roll 
298; See also Brinkerhoff to AAAG, Santa Fé, 13 August 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 
1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.737; ‘Grierson’s Report’, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644 
39 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company F & Company L, 10th Cavalry, July/Aug 1880 in NA, 
RG94; Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 August 1880, to Act. Asst. 
Adjt General Santa Fé NM 10 August 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 440 pp.84-88; AAG, Dept of Texas to AG 
Chicago, 11 August 1880, ‘Victorio Campaign, Feb. 1879-Nov. 1880’ in ‘Victorio Special Files’, NA, RG393, 
M1495, Roll 14; ‘Grierson’s Report’, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Proceedings of a Board of 
Survey convened at Camp Safford, 21 August 1880 in Unregistered Letters 1878-1881, HQ DoP, NA, M1381, 
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Capt. Kennedy with part of Co’s F & “L”40 pursued the Indians some five days, but 
without avail, on Aug 6. 80 encountered while on trail of Indians referred to above, a 
small party of Indians one squaw of number being shot and Killed in the ?melee? and 
one pony shot & one captured.41 
 
By the time Grierson received news of these incidents he clearly concluded that these were 
the same Apaches pursued out of the Sierra Diablo by Capt. Lebo’s company.42 However, he 
would have had every incentive to omit this detail from his subsequent campaign report. 
After all, he had assured his superiors that by deploying his forces in Western Texas he could 
prevent the Apaches from reaching the Mescalero reservation in New Mexico. 
 
Incomplete Survey? 
 
In the immediate aftermath of Rattlesnake Springs, between 6 and 11 August, the 
detachments of troops sent to springs Grierson had chosen to picket did not encounter nor 
detect signs of Apaches. On 8 August it was established that after Rattlesnake Springs, 
Victorio’s following had sought refuge in the Sierra Diablo. The trail that was discovered on 
11 August headed west out of the Sierra Diablo and was estimated as being 36 hours old.43 
The Apaches must have had access to a reliable water source somewhere in those mountains 
between 6 and 9 August. Moreover, some of Grierson’s troops, including his Pueblo scouts, 
scouted the Sierra Diablo on 9 of August and failed to detect any Apaches. More important, 
the time spent by the Apaches in the Sierra Diablo means that there must have been a good 
supply of water for both themselves and their horses.44 This water had clearly not been 
discovered by the Tenth Cavalry when they surveyed the region in 1878 and 1879. 
 
The Pueblo Scouts. 
 
Had Grierson been accompanied by an Apache scout company recruited from San Carlos, 
then Victorio would not have benefitted from over two days respite in the Sierra Diablo after 
withdrawing from Rattlesnake Springs. Apache scouts did not appear to have any difficulty in 
operating in unfamiliar terrain in the Southwest. These scouts had managed to penetrate into 
the heart of Chihenne Apache territory when they had inflicted a serious defeat upon Victorio 
on the Palomas River in the Black Range Mountains in New Mexico on 24/25 May, 1880. 
They would also penetrate the depths of the Sierra Madre in 1883 as the main part of General 
George Crook’s expedition against the last independent Chiricahua Apaches in 1883.  
Although the Pueblo scouts appear to have done very well until Tinaja de las Palmas, 
the Tenth Cavalry’s final verdict on their performance was quite negative. Captain Nicholas 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Roll 2; The Grant County Herald, 14 August 1880; ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 18, 14 August 
1880, p.30 
40 Captain Kennedy, Company F, Tenth Cavalry appears to have placed any mention of other companies of the 
Tenth Cavalry within inverted commas when completing the bi-monthly muster roll for his own company. 
41 Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for Company F, 10th Cavalry July/Aug 1880 in NA, RG94 
42 Beck to Kennedy, 11 August 1880 in Letters Sent September 19,1879 – August 11, 1880, HQ DoP, NA, 
M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.137; ‘Grierson’s Report’, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644 
43 Carpenter to Beck, AAAG, 16 August 1880 in Unregistered Letters 1878-1881, HQ DoP, NA, RG393, 
M1381, Roll 2 
44 On their withdrawal to Mexico, the Apaches ambushed a stagecoach in Quitman Canyon on 10 August, 1880, 
and killed an ex-Civil War General, J.J. Byrne. The driver stated that the Apaches, seventy in number, mounted 
their horses and pursued the coach for some distance before giving up the chase. (‘The Driver’s Account of 
how Gen. J.J. Byrne was Killed’, The Grant County Herald, 9 October 1880) 
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Nolan, Tenth Cavalry reported on 19 August, 1880, that he had sent some Pueblo scouts into 
Mexico to shadow the retreating Apaches, but that they had returned within two days because 
their horses were worn out. The Captain clearly did not believe their account.45 At the end of 
the Pueblo scouts six month service on 22 September, 1880, Grierson stated that they “could 
not be induced to re-enlist again for either love or money.”46 He also noted that some of these 
scouts were, in his opinion, “worthless.”47 This judgement would seem to be particularly 
unfair, especially in the light of the contribution these scouts made to the early transmitting of 
accurate intelligence to Grierson. However, they had failed to detect the enemy in the Sierra 
Diablo, and by the time the trail was discovered, Victorio had been given a sufficient enough 
start to be able to keep ahead of the pursuit until reaching Mexico. It is doubtful that an 
Apache scout company would have failed to spot them. 
 
These issues considerably undermine the overall impression that Grierson, barring his epic 65 
mile march to cut off the Apaches at Rattlesnake Springs48, was firmly in control of events 
during his campaign against Victorio. Indeed, the combination of a less than secure picket 
line, an incomplete survey and the disputed performance of his Pueblo scouts suggest that 
there is more to this campaign than meets the eye. They provide glimpses of a deeper 
problem with historical accounts of this conflict. Grierson had difficulties in winning this 
campaign because Victorio was pursuing an operational strategy that had previously worked 
perfectly against the Ninth Cavalry in New Mexico and which came very close to working 
against Grierson. If this aspect of the campaign is illuminated, this should lead to greater 
appreciation of the efforts made by Grierson and his forces to win the campaign. In other 
words, no account of this campaign is complete without an investigation of the stratagems 
employed by the Apaches. 
 
Victorio’s Strategy. 
 
In June and early July of 1880, Victorio’s warriors had been raiding in northern Chihuahua 
and taken a large number of horses, cattle and other plunder.49 The probable purpose of the 
raiding was twofold: to remount his following on fresh horses, and to move the balance of the 
loot taken in Mexico to the Mescalero Apache reservation to trade for fresh guns and 
ammunition. Moreover, he was also accompanied by a large number of women and children. 
When Victorio was later trapped and killed at Tres Castillos on 14/15 October, 1880, 
                                                          
45 Nolan to AAG, Dist. of the Pecos, 19 August 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d by General Grierson in the Field June 
30-Sept. 14, 1880 HQ DoP, NA, M1381, Roll 4 
46 Grierson to AAG, Dept of Texas, 31 December 1880 in Letters Sent August 23-December 31 1880, HQ DoP, 
NA, M1381, Roll 1, Letter No.168;  
47 “The term of service of the Pueblo Scouts expired yesterday. Will you grant authority to re-enlist them or 
other scouts in their place, some of those discharged are worthless but it is probable that good scouts can be 
obtained.” (Grierson to AAG, Dept Texas, 23 September 1880 in Telegrams Sent June 23, -November 30, 1880, 
HQ DoP, NA, M1381, Roll 1, p.165, Letter No.495) 
48 See Map 1, Note 15. 
49 Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth quoted in ‘Indian Affairs’, Army & Navy Journal, Vol. 17, 24 July 1880, 
p.1048; Loud to Morrow, Fort Bayard, 30 June 1880 (p.571) & Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 13 July 1880, 
Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, pp.605-606; Pope to AAG HQ 
Division of the Missouri, 2 July 1880, & Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 13 July 1880, in ‘Victorio Special 
Files’, NA, M1495, Roll 14; Hatch to AAG Ft Leavenworth, 13 July 1880 in ‘Victorio Papers’, NA, M666, Roll 
527; Hatch to Grierson, 14 July 1880 in Register of Telegrams Rec’d October 11, 1879-October 8, 1880, HQ 
DoP, NA, M1381, Roll 2, p.193, Letter No.329; ‘By Telegraph’, The Grant County Herald, 3 July 1880; 
Thrapp, 1974, pp.285-286; Thrapp, 1967, p.203 
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eighteen women and children were killed and sixty-eight women and children captured.50 
Apache testimony also records that among the dead (classed by the Mexicans as warriors) 
were a number of adolescent boys who were not old enough to be warriors, but seen as too 
old to either enslave or assimilate into Mexican society.51 Such a large group of captured 
stock, women and children would be quite vulnerable. If spotted it would be virtually 
impossible to pass this group through Grierson’s defences to the Mescalero reservation. 
Despite the dangers, Victorio had successfully accomplished this same task in January 
1880 when he penetrated U.S. army picket lines in New Mexico. To accomplish this goal, he 
had divided his following into two groups. The first consisted of warriors, whose task was to 
attract the attention of the U.S. army and draw them into pursuing a group of heavily armed, 
well mounted Apaches unencumbered by loot and dependents. Once the army had taken the 
bait, the second group, made up of a small number of warriors, escorted their dependents and 
plunder ahead of Mexican troops through the area vacated by the U.S. army and made its way 
unmolested to the Mescalero Reservation.52 Victorio appears to have employed the same 
technique when he was confronted by Grierson in July 1880. He had to get his following past 
Grierson without his plunder and families being detected by the Tenth Cavalry. Thus, the 
events of 30 July: the skirmish at Tinaja de las Palmas, and the attack on the stagecoach 
between that point and Eagle Springs, take on a very different meaning.  
The ‘luck’ of Grierson’s small party spotting one of Victorio’s scouts at Tinaja de las 
Palmas is curiously fortuitous considering the ability of individual Apaches to remain 
undetected should they so wish. The battle at Tinaja de las Palmas also appears anomalous. 
The approximately sixty warriors, had they intended passing that way, would have had little 
difficulty in pinning Grierson’s small force down, infiltrating their force around from south to 
north and then disengaging. Grierson’s small picket would have been able to do little to 
prevent them. However, if Victorio’s purpose was to decoy the garrison at Eagle Springs to 
the west to allow the second group of Apaches to pass through, the prolonged skirmishing 
with the Tenth Cavalry at Tinaja de las Palmas makes far more sense. This succeeded in 
drawing in two companies of cavalry westwards from Eagle Springs, and a third company 
eastwards from Old Fort Quitman. As noted earlier, the attack upon the stagecoach, travelling 
between Tinaja de las Palmas and Eagle Springs, killed two people, yet a third man 
‘miraculously’ escaped53, undoubtedly because the Apaches wanted the Tenth Cavalry to 
react to reports of attacks west of Eagle Springs. Movement west away from Eagle Springs 
(see Map Two) might open a gap between Eagle Springs and Van Horn Wells54 through 
which Victorio’s plunder and dependents could pass without detection.   
                                                          
50 Samaniego cited in Buell to AAAG Santa Fé 19 October 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, p.271; 
Brinkerhoff to AAAG Santa Fé 20 October 1880, NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 439, pp.275-276; Hatch to Pope, 21 
October 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.969; Terrazas 
cited in Scott to Hunter, 2nd Assistant Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 22 October 1880 in Consular 
Despatches Chihuahua Mexico 1830-1906, NA, M289, Roll 2; See also Thrapp, 1974, p.303; Haley, 1981, 
p.331; Henry Parker, Chief of Scouts cited in ‘Town and County’, The Grant County Herald, 23 October 1880 
51 See Kaywaykla, as told to Eve Ball. “Nana’s People,” True West, Vol X No. 6 (July-August, 1963), p.21;Eve 
Ball, 1970, In the Days of Victorio: Recollections of a Warm Springs Apache (University of Arizona Press: 
Tucson) pp.169-170; Eve Ball, with Nora Henn and Lynda A. Sánchez, 1980, Indeh: An Apache Odyssey 
(University of Oklahoma Press: Norman) p.79 p.83 
52 For more detail of Victorio’s decoy strategy in January-February 1880 see Watt, R.N., “Victorio’s Military & 
Political Leadership of the Warm Springs Apaches” War in History Vol. 18, Issue  4, (November 2011) pp.468-
471 
53 Baylor, G.W., 1996, Into the Far Wild Country: True Tales of the Old Southwest (Texas Western Press, The 
University of Texas at El Paso: El Paso) p.257 
54 At the TSHA Meeting, San Antonio, Texas, 7 March, 2014, Col. (Ret.), Thomas ‘Ty’ Smith, U.S. Army, 
pointed out that the original name was Van Horne’s Wells, named after Bvt. Maj. Jefferson Van Horne, Third 
Infantry and not after Lt. James Judson Van Horn, Eighth Infantry. (See Smith, T.T., Thompson, J.D., Wooster, 
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Map 2: Victorio’s Decoy Strategy: Western Texas July/August 1880.55 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
R. & Pingenot, B.E. (Ed), 2008, The Reminiscences of Major General Zenas R. Bliss, 1854-1876: From the 
Texas Frontier to the Civil War and Back Again (Texas State Historical Association, Denton) p. 89) 
55 As noted earlier the grid squares measure 27.5km by 27.5km apart from the eastern border of the map where 
it measures 27.5km by 16.5km 
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Key Date Event 
1. 29-30 July, 
1880. 
Victorio splits his force into two groups. He takes the first group made up 
exclusively of warriors across the Rio Grande in an attempt to decoy 
Grierson’s troops away from Eagle Springs. By attacking Grierson at Tinaja 
de las Palmas he attracts the attention of the forces stationed at Eagle Springs 
and Old Fort Quitman. 
2. 29-31 July, 
1880. 
If Victorio and his group of warriors are successful in drawing the forces at 
Eagle Springs westwards then this should give the second group made up of 
Victorio’s dependents and plunder, escorted by a few warriors, the 
opportunity to pass northwards towards New Mexico by passing between the 
Eagle and Van Horn Mountains. This group is camping somewhere between 
the Sierra El Alambre and the Sierra Los Pilares. 
 
Failure No.1 
Victorio fails to move Grierson west as the latter is already aware, through 
information received from both the Mexican army’s scouts and then his own 
scouts that there is a large group of Apaches just across the border between 
the Sierra El Alambre and the Sierra Los Pilares. 
3. 30 July, 1880. Grierson quickly moves his forces back to Eagle Springs. This point is 
relatively high on the northern slope of the Eagle Mountains and affords a 
good view of the the valley between the Eagle & Van Horn Mountains and 
north to the Carrizo Mountains. From Eagle Springs Grierson sent out small 
scouting patrols southwards to monitor the movements of the Apaches 
camped at 2. 
4. 2-4 August, 
1880. 
Grierson, based on knowledge of the location of the second group of 
Apaches’, decides that the next likely spot for a border incursion is to the east 
of Eagle Springs and moves some of his troops to Van Horn Wells and 
beyond. Later news of the clash between the patrol sent to Alamo Springs 
convinced the Colonel to move the rest of his force to Van Horn Wells and 
beyond in an effort to head off the Apaches. 
5. 4 August, 
1880. 
The telegraph line between Old Fort Quitman and Eagle Springs is cut. Once 
again this appears to be an attempt to draw Grierson westwards to allow the 
second group of Apaches an unimpeded passage north to the New Mexico. 
 
 
Failure No.2 
The scouting party which encountered the second group of Apaches near 
Alamo Springs manages to alert Grierson. By the time the telegraph line is 
cut Grierson is already aware of the approximate location of the second group 
and has moved east in an attempt to intercept them.  
6. 3-5 August, 
1880. 
The Apaches hold off the scouting party and move to the north and east 
towards the Van Horn Mountains. Once they have escaped from the patrol, 
they change their line of march to the northwest and make for Fresno Springs. 
Here they probably rendezvous with Victorio’s party of warriors. 
 
Failure No.3 
Grierson’s scout patrol and stagecoach employees warn the colonel that he 
has probably been outmanoeuvred in sufficient time for him to redeploy his 
forces and move north. 
7. 5-6 August, 
1880. 
Grierson manages to get his forces to Rattlesnake Springs in advance of 
Victorio and forces the Apaches to retreat back to the south. Despite losing 
track of Victorio between 7 and 11 August, this manoeuvre wins the 
campaign for Grierson as Victorio is forced to return to Mexico with his 
plunder. 
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Victorio’s strategy depended upon the second group remaining undetected until the leading 
column drew attention to themselves. Yet, as noted earlier, when the first group of Apaches 
attacked at Tinaja de las Palmas, Grierson had already located the second group of Apaches. 
Thus, on 29 July, Colonel Valle’s scout reports gave a broad but first hand indication to 
Grierson that the main body of the Apaches were to the east roughly opposite Alamo 
Springs56. (See Map One, Note 12) The broad location was quickly confirmed by Grierson’s 
own scouts on the same day57 and the exact location; approximately fifty miles to the 
southeast of Old Fort Quitman, was pinpointed by his scouts on 31 July, 1880.58 In the light 
of this information, Grierson assumed that he had blocked an attempt to pass through his 
picket lines and that the Apaches had returned to where the main group was camped.  
Grierson’s assumption was erroneous in assuming that the Apaches who had engaged 
him at Tinaja de las Palmas had returned across the Rio Grande to their main encampment. A 
small detachment of Texas Rangers59 had joined the campaign from their base at Ysleta, 
Texas which is situated to the north west of Old Fort Quitman along the Rio Grande. They 
arrived at Old Fort Quitman on 4 August to find that the telegraph wire had been cut and they 
could not contact Eagle Springs. They rode on to Tinaja de las Palmas and tracked the 
Apaches, finding that some of these warriors had also been responsible for the attack on the 
stagecoach discovered by Grierson as he returned to Eagle Springs on 30 July. The Rangers 
continued tracking the Apaches, following the trail to the south, then east to where the 
Apaches had completely destroyed almost one quarter of a mile of telegraph line near the 
Eagle Mountains.60 The comprehensive damage suggests the work of a large body of 
warriors. This certainly supports the idea that Victorio was trying to attract the attention of 
Grierson to the west between 30 July and 4 August, 1880. This group had probably stationed 
themselves in the Eagle Mountains during this time, which would have allowed them to 
monitor the activity of the five companies of Tenth Cavalry that Grierson had by then 
mustered at Eagle Springs. 
Grierson was correct, however, in concluding that there was a large Apache grouping 
to the southeast, not the west, and he rightly assumed that he should focus his efforts here. 
Accordingly he sent out several small scouting parties, fanning them out southwards towards 
the last known location of the second group of Apaches camped just over the Rio Grande in 
New Mexico. So, when the decoy group of Apache warriors cut the telegraph line to the west 
on 3/4 August, 1880, Grierson again ignored their efforts to lure him to the west. Scouting 
reports confirmed that, what Grierson thought to be the main group of Apaches, had crossed 
the border. (See Map Two) The Tenth Cavalrymen encountered by the Apaches at Alamo 
Springs on 3 August 1880, were a “small” scouting party led by Corporal Asa Weaver with 
members drawn from several companies of the regiment.61 The patrol’s size notwithstanding 
they engaged an estimated 125-15062 Apaches in a fifteen mile running fight.63 If we factor in 
                                                          
56 Brinkerhoff to Act. Asst. Adjt. General Santa Fé 31st July 1880, NA, RG 393, Pt.3, Entry 440, pp.96-97 
57 Gilmore, Eagle Springs to AAAG,, DoP, Fort Quitman 12:15pm, 29 July 1880 in Telegrams Rec’d by 
General Grierson in the Field June 30-Sept. 14, 1880 HQ DoP, NA, M1381, Roll 4; See also Robert Grierson 
Diary, 29 July 1880.  
58 Grierson to CO Mexican Troops opposite Quitman, 31 July 1880 in Telegrams Sent June 23, -November 30, 
1880, HQ DoP, NA, M1381, Roll 1, p.85, Letter No.360 
59 These Rangers were from a small company of Texas Rangers based at Ysleta commanded by George W. 
Baylor. On 2 August, 1880, Grierson had requested that they scout east towards Eagle Springs. (Baylor, 1996, 
p.253) Baylor and fourteen Rangers duly set out and while they did not encounter any Apaches, the account left 
by Baylor provides possible insight as to what Victorio might have been trying to achieve. 
60 Baylor, 1996, p.253; See also Whipple to Sheridan, 11 August 1880, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2538, p.359 
61 Bi-Monthly Returns for Company H, 10th Cavalry July/Aug 1880 in RG94, Bi-Monthly Muster Rolls; Returns 
From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916 Fort Davis, Texas Jan 1879-June 1891, M617 Roll 298– from Record 
Groups 393 
62 Robert Grierson Diary, 4 August 1880; ‘Grierson’s Report’, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644 
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the broad numbers of women, children and adolescents later present at Tres Castillos in 
October 1880, then most of the group encountered by Weaver’s detachment were probably 
not warriors. If those Apaches who had engaged Grierson at Tinaja de las Palmas had 
returned to this group, there would have been more than enough warriors to block Corporal 
Weaver’s pursuit. Indeed, several times during their previous encounters with the Ninth 
Cavalry in 1879-80, Victorio’s warriors, if they had sufficient numbers, were more than 
willing to stand their ground against relatively large units of troops. The fact that the Apaches 
tried to evade Weaver’s small detachment suggests that there were not many warriors present.  
Victorio’s decoy strategy was undermined because Grierson had received clear 
intelligence as to the location of the second and more vulnerable group of Apaches before the 
first group of warriors tried to tempt the Tenth Cavalry westwards from Eagle Springs. His 
second attempt to decoy Grierson away from Eagle Springs by cutting the telegraph line was 
doomed for Grierson had focused his scouting parties upon what he assumed was the main 
party of Apaches. One of these scout detachments had quickly detected the second group of 
Apaches shortly after it crossed the Rio Grande. 
 
However, this was not the end of the campaign; to continue their resistance to the U.S. and 
Mexico, the Apaches had to replenish their stocks of arms and ammunition and secure forage 
and water. The most reliable source of munitions was from the illicit trade networks on the 
Mescalero Reservation in New Mexico. The decoy strategy having failed, the second group 
of Apaches had the stark choice of retreating back into Mexico; staying where they were and 
hoping that the Mexican armed forces did not track them down; or breaking through 
Grierson’s thin lines to rendezvous with Victorio at Fresno Springs. That they chose the latter 
option should not be surprising. The key determinant here was the need for fresh supplies of 
rifles and ammunition and fresh sources of water and forage. Another determining factor has 
to be speculative, but is worth considering: it was standard practice for Apaches, when 
separating, to set the time and location for rendezvous. Victorio had probably set a number of 
days to be allocated to allow sufficient time for the decoy attempt. If everything had worked 
to plan and both groups joined at Fresno Springs, then there was a clear line of water sources 
running north into New Mexico. Even if pursued, there would be sufficient warriors to hold 
off their pursuers. Victorio’s warriors were past masters of the delaying action, as the Ninth 
Cavalry could attest from their earlier experiences in New Mexico. They also still had 
sufficient stocks of ammunition, as the vigorous skirmishing that did occur around 
Rattlesnake Springs on 6 August attests. Therefore, on balance, an attempt to break through 
Grierson’s defences was still worth the risk. 
Thus, when this group encountered Weaver’s scouting party, they now knew that it 
was their responsibility to outmanoeuvre their enemies. As Weaver turned back to Eagle 
Springs to alert Grierson, the Apaches were seen to be heading to the northeast.64 On receipt 
of this information, Grierson moved his forces to the east to cut off the Apaches, whom he 
suspected to be making for Van Horn Wells.65 Once the second group of Apaches were 
convinced that they had escaped from Weaver, they turned to the northwest and managed to 
pass behind Grierson en route to the rendezvous at Fresno Spring. As they crossed the stage 
line between Eagle Springs and Van Horn Wells, they were spotted by an eastbound 
stagecoach which beat a hasty retreat to Eagle Springs. When the stagecoach tried the same 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
63 Bi-Monthly Returns for Company H, 10th Cavalry July/Aug 1880 in RG94, Bi-Monthly Muster Rolls; Returns 
From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916 Fort Davis, Texas Jan 1879-June 1891, NA, M617 Roll 298 
64 ‘Grierson’s Report’, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Robert Grierson Diary, 4 August 1880.  
65 ‘Grierson’s Report’, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, pp.639-644; Bi-Monthly Company Muster Rolls for 
Company A & B, 10th Cavalry July/Aug 1880 in NA, RG94; Record of Events August 1880 in Returns From 
U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Fort Davis, Texas Jan 1879-June 1891, NA, M617, Roll 298 
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route later in the day, it was found that the Apaches had wrecked another section of the 
telegraph line between Eagle Springs and Van Horn Wells.66 The Apaches’ intent in cutting 
the telegraph line was to delay, for as long as possible, the news that they had passed between 
Eagle Springs and Van Horn Wells, from reaching Grierson. Nevertheless, one of Grierson’s 
small scouting detachments independently confirmed the information that the Apaches had, 
for the moment, outmanoeuvred the Tenth Cavalry.67 Now knowing the broad direction taken 
by the Apaches, Grierson was able to use the knowledge gathered by the Tenth Cavalry 
surveys to guess their probable destination. Grierson gathered his troops and force-marched 
them approximately 65 miles north to Rattlesnake Springs in sufficient time to prevent the 
majority of Victorio’s following from reaching New Mexico and fresh supplies of munitions.  
 
This part of the campaign shows the adaptability of both sides in this campaign in Western 
Texas. When the second group of Apaches realised that they had been discovered, they led 
their pursuers into believing that they were making in one direction. Once the immediate 
pursuit was thrown off, they changed direction and slipped behind Grierson. There was an 
element of fortune in the discovery of the Apaches by the stage driver, but Grierson’s own 
scouting patrols also confirmed this information in sufficient time for him to react and 
successfully counter this move. Once he knew that he had been deceived, Grierson did not try 
to pursue the Apaches; he had seen the results of such practices upon the Ninth Cavalry. He 
immediately sought to get ahead of the Apaches. Thus, on approaching Rattlesnake Springs 
around midday of 6 August 1880, Victorio found himself confronted by four companies (B, 
C, G, & H) of the Tenth Cavalry. (See Table One) Moreover, Grierson had independently 
sent orders to Company K, Tenth Cavalry, tasking them with scouring these same mountains, 
and had detached another company from Rattlesnake Springs to scout into the Sierra Diablo. 
Thus, by the time he confronted Victorio at Rattlesnake Springs, four out of the eight 
companies of the Tenth Cavalry deployed for this campaign were present. A fifth was within 
easy recall and the sixth was within a day’s march and would join Grierson the following day 
at Rattlesnake Springs. The Apaches did not have the strength, nor more importantly, the 
inclination, to force their way through Grierson’s forces as the fight at Rattlesnake Springs 
clearly demonstrated. An attempt to force their way through the Tenth Cavalry would have 
almost certainly have resulted in unacceptable losses for the Apaches, breaching their most 
fundamental principle of war: that of sustaining minimal losses, for maximum gain. 
At no point during this campaign did Grierson opt to pursue an Apache trail. The 
lesson learned by Grierson from observing the Ninth Cavalry’s punishing experience against 
Victorio in New Mexico was one of the reasons for Grierson’s success in western Texas in 
July/August, 1880. In other words, had Grierson decided to pursue rather than block Victorio, 
he would have lost the campaign. 
 
  
                                                          
66 Loud to Buell, 7th August 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 
431, pp.713-714; Hatch to AAG Fort Leavenworth, 10th August 1880, Telegrams Sent DoNM, Vol.3, Jan. – 
Nov. 1880 NA, RG393, Part 3, Entry 431, p.724 
67 Grierson to AAG, Dept. Texas, 8 August 1880 in Telegrams Sent June 23, -November 30, 1880, HQ DoP, 
NA, RG393, M1381, Roll 1, pp.99-101, Letter No.384; Brinkerhoff, citing dispatch rec’d from Grierson, 
Rattlesnake Springs, rec’d 9 August 1880, to AAAG, Santa Fé NM 10 August 1880, NA, RG393 Part 3 Entry 
440 pp.84-88; AAG, Dept of Texas to AG Chicago, 11 August 1880, ‘Victorio Campaign, Feb. 1879-Nov. 
1880’ in ‘Victorio Special Files’, NA, M1495, Roll 14; ‘Grierson’s Report’, NA, RG393, Part 1, Entry 2546, 
pp.639-644 
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Table One: Tenth Cavalry Deployments July/August 1880.68 
(Please note that entries highlighted in Bold Type indicate when these companies were under the direct 
command of Colonel Grierson) 
Co. Officer Date Record of Event July/August 1880 
A Captain 
Nicholas 
Nolan 
28 July 
30 July 
 
2 Aug 
3 Aug. 
4 to 6 Aug 
7 to 9 Aug 
10 Aug 
11 Aug 
12 Aug 
Arrived at Fort Quitman. 
Marched to 18 Mile Waterhole (Tinaja de las Palmas) to relieve Col. Grierson thence to 
Eagle Springs. 
Left Eagle Springs to Van Horns Wells.  
Marched to Devils Race Course.  
Marched to Rattlesnakes Springs. 
Scouted Sierra Diablo and picket passes.  
Marched to Ash (Fresno) Springs.  
Picked up Victorio’s trail 8pm. 11.45am  
Confirmed Victorio back in Mexico.  
B Lieutenant 
Thaddeus W. 
Jones 
27 July 
29 July 
 
3 Aug 
5-6 Aug 
7 Aug 
11-12 Aug 
12 Aug 
21-22 Aug 
Marched to Viejo Pass  
Left with battalion under Capt. Carpenter for Eagle Springs arrived 30 July and joined 
Grierson’s command. 
Left Eagle Springs 3rd Aug. to Devil’s Race Track69 
Marched to Rattlesnake Springs.  
Moved from Rattlesnake Spring to Sulphur Springs 
Marched from Sulphur Springs to Eagle Spring  
12th – Left Eagle Spring s down Quitman road and returned to Eagle Springs. Left Eagle 
Springs to Ojo Caliente. 
C Captain 
Charles D. 
Viele 
25 July 
29 July 
30 July 
 
6 Aug 
7 Aug 
Left Fort Davis 
Arrived Eagle Springs  
Engaged hostile Apaches at Tinaja de las Palmas lost one man and five horses killed in 
action, one horse and one mule wounded in action. 
In action Rattlesnake Springs.  
Moved from Rattlesnake Springs to Sulphur Springs. 
F Captain 
William B. 
Kennedy 
26 July 
onwards 
 
Arrived at Camp Safford, Guadalupe Mountains (See 14 on Map 1) 
Pvt. Wm Taylor killed in action with detachment under Sgt. Richardson. Also lost five horses 
fully equipped etc.  
G Lieutenant 
Samuel R. 
Colladay 
24 July 
30 July 
 
3 Aug 
4-5 Aug 
6 Aug 
7 Aug 
Arrived at Eagle Springs  
Engaged hostile Apaches. One Officer and one enlisted man wounded in action and 5 
horses killed/wounded in action. 
Eagle Spring to Van Horns Wells 
Aug marched to Rattlesnake Springs.  
Engaged Apaches. No Casualties.  
Marched to Sulphur Springs 
H Captain 
Louis H. 
Carpenter 
27 July 
29 July 
3 Aug 
5-6 Aug 
6 Aug 
7 Aug 
11-12 Aug 
21-22 Aug 
Marched to Viejo Pass  
Left for Eagle Springs arrived 30 July  
Company left Eagle Springs for Van Horns Wells on to the Devils Race Track then on to 
Rattlesnake Spring.  
Engaged Victorio  
Marched to Sulphur Springs 
Marched to Eagle Springs 
then with Co’s B & K to the Rio Grande at Hot Springs. 
I Captain 
Theodore A. 
Baldwin 
27 July 
14-15 Aug 
Arrived at Viejo Pass 27th July  
Patrolled between Viejo Pass & Quitman returned to Viejo Pass 15 August. 
K Captain 
Thomas C. 
Lebo 
20 July 
21-31 July 
31 July- 
7 Aug 
7 Aug 
13 Aug 
21-22 Aug 
Left Fort Davis  
Scouted the region around the Carrizo Mountains and on to Fresno 
Scouted in and about the Sierra Diablo. On 1 Aug captured an Apache camp in these 
mountains. 
Joined Grierson at Rattlesnake Springs. 
Marched from Rattlesnake Spring to Eagle Springs  
Left Eagle Springs and proceeded to Ojo Caliente, Texas. 
                                                          
68 This table is derived from the Record of Events July & August 1880 in Returns From Regular Army Cavalry 
Regiments 1833-1916, 10th Cavalry Regimental Returns 1873 to 1880, NA, M744, Roll 96; Bi-Monthly 
Company Muster Rolls for Companies A, B C, F, G, H, I & K, 10th Cavalry, July/Aug 1880 in NA, RG94; 
Return for June 1880 in Returns From U.S. Military Posts 1800-1916, Fort Concho, Texas Jan 1879-June 1889, 
NA, M617, Roll 242 
69 This probably refers to the terrain to the southeast of Van Horn Wells. On visiting Eagle Springs, Van Horn 
Wells and Fort Davis in 2006 it struck me that this was an appropriate name for this area (the ground was flat 
and the temperature was hot) but the title does not appear to have survived long enough to be used on modern 
maps. 
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Conclusion. 
 
When Grierson’s campaign against Victorio in July-August is examined, an immediate 
conclusion is that his technique of picketing passes, river crossings and passes was broadly 
correct. Grierson also deployed a screen of small patrols in an effort to detect Apaches and 
did his best to maintain effective communication and coordination with Mexican forces. Yet 
this can only be fully appreciated if we understand the skill of his opponents. Victorio was 
trying to outmanoeuvre him using a very clever decoy stratagem and, when that failed, 
attempted to draw Grierson into a horse-killing pursuit. Whether Grierson fully appreciated 
the decoy stratagem is open to question but he was never going to allow himself to be 
deceived into chasing Victorio. 
Had Grierson only been contending with Apache warriors, unencumbered with 
plunder and/or dependents, one suspects that they would have penetrated his defences with 
little difficulty. It was the early discovery of Victorio’s dependents and plunder that is one of 
the two key factors as to why Grierson won. The other critical factor in Grierson’s victory 
was his refusal to be drawn into a pursuit of the trail of Apaches. Instead, the colonel opted to 
move his forces parallel to, and then ahead of, his opponents. 
Finally, Grierson was one of the few U.S. Commanders who defeated Chiricahua and 
Mescalero Apaches without the assistance of Apache scouts, which makes his victory all the 
more remarkable. His Pueblo scouts played a significant part in helping Grierson pinpoint the 
location of the second group of Apaches before Victorio could deploy his decoy party. 
However, they did not locate Victorio in the Sierra Diablo when Grierson had six companies 
of the Tenth Cavalry in or around those mountains. Had there been an Apache scout company 
assigned to Grierson, it is highly unlikely that Victorio would have found a secure refuge for 
more than two days in the Sierra Diablo. Had an Apache scout company been present 
Victorio might have been able to effect a retreat back into Mexico. Yet the Apaches would 
almost certainly have found themselves in an even more perilous position than that which 
they actually found themselves at the end of their campaign against Grierson. 
From the Apache point of view, Victorio must have quickly appreciated the calibre of 
his opponent, but he had little choice but to engage Grierson. His main challenge was to 
maintain a steady supply of rifles and ammunition to prosecute a long-drawn campaign. 
Victorio had to reach the Mescalero reservation in New Mexico, as this was the most reliable 
source of such munitions.70 Subsequent events would show that the failure of his campaign 
against Grierson left his following critically short of ammunition. It was that shortage of 
ammunition which finished Victorio. When he was caught by Mexican state troops under 
Colonel Joaquin Terrazas on the 14/15 October, 1880, half his warriors were absent looking 
for fresh stocks of ammunition. The trapped Apaches were thus relatively easy prey for 
Terrazas’ troops. 
 
If we remove Victorio from an account of the campaign in Western Texas against the Tenth 
Cavalry, we obscure his status as one of the great Chihenne/Chiricahua Apache leaders. In 
doing so, we also fail to fully appreciate Grierson’s leadership. His scouting and survey work 
                                                          
70 While the U.S. army had effectively closed down the Mescalero reservation in April 1880 it does not 
necessarily follow that they had closed down the illicit trade of stolen stock and other plunder for rifles and 
ammunition. One suspects that the Mescalero Apaches involved in these transactions were probably middlemen 
between those U.S. citizens willing to engage in such trade. There were a number of Mescalero Apaches with 
Victorio who could have fulfilled this role. In addition, Nana, one of Victorio’s key lieutenants, had been 
engaging in this activity on the Mescalero reservation since late 1878 and would probably have made his own 
trading contacts. 
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may not have been as perfect as is sometimes portrayed and his situation reports to his 
superiors were not as honest as they could have been. Nevertheless, this knowledge of the 
terrain, combined with his use of active scouting, sufficient understanding of his opponent 
and cooperation with Mexican forces, enabled him to pinpoint Victorio’s key vulnerability. In 
the short term, the colonel explicitly refused to engage in fruitless pursuits of the Apaches, 
but predicted their line of march and blocked their passage north into New Mexico. In the 
long term, by denying Victorio access to the Mescalero Apache reservation, Grierson 
prevented the Apaches from gaining fresh supplies of rifles and ammunition. As such, 
Grierson inflicted a crippling wound in August 1880 which ultimately allowed Terrazas to 
administer the coup-de-grâce in October 1880.  
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